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International migration not only enables individuals to earn higher wages but
also exposes them to new environments. The norms and values experienced in
destination countries can change the behavior of migrants and also of family
members left behind. This paper suggests that brain gain can take place due to a
change in the educational aspirations of caregivers in migrant households. Estimates
for Moldova show that international migration raises parental aspirations in
households located at the lower end of the human capital distribution. The
identification of these effects relies on GDP growth shocks in the destination
countries and migration networks. These results imply that aspirations are a highly
relevant determinant of intergenerational human capital transfer and that even
temporary international migration can shift human capital formation to a higher
steady state by inducing higher educational aspirations among caregivers.
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The nexus between international migration and human capital remains a disputed
topic. At the individual level, the positive effect remittances can have by relaxing
liquidity constraints and thus enabling educational investments are often cited and
widely acknowledged (see Antman 2013). However, at the aggregate level, the outflow
of skilled migrants – what has been termed brain drain – has been characterized as
detrimental to the sustainable growth of developing countries. Only recently has this
perspective been challenged by various authors (e.g., Stark et al. 1997, Beine et al.
2001), who theoretically demonstrate that the option to migrate can increase human
capital investments by individuals. Their argument is rooted in a neo-classical frame-
work emphasizing that the incentive to invest is driven by the possible higher returns
to education from going abroad. Since not all individuals who invest in education to
migrate actually leave the country, a net increase of the human capital stock in the
sending countries takes place. This hypothesis has been supported empirically by
recent macro studies (e.g., Beine et al. 2007), but only few studies have attempted to
empirically test the human capital externalities of migration at the household level.
Batista et al. (2012) are a notable exception, presenting evidence for the case of Cape
Verde that cannot reject the brain gain hypothesis.2015 Böhme. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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households and suggests a brain gain effect through a different causal channel. It argues
that individuals and households do not maximize their utility independent of their
environment and social context but that their decisions, to e.g., invest in education, are
bound to the goals and aspirations set by their environments. This approach was
suggested recently by Ray (2006), who pointed out that aspirations are an important
determinant of behavior and could represent a key element of economic development.
In line with this perspective, the hypothesis that individuals adapt their aspirations if
exposed to new environments is tested. The variation of norms and values that
international migrants are exposed to makes it possible to find out if migration has
positive or negative human capital externalities, such as through changing the educa-
tional aspirations of households.
The empirical analysis of household data from Moldova shows a strong relationship
between enrollment, schooling expenditures and the educational aspiration caregivers
have for their children. This finding supports the importance of aspirations for the
analysis of household behavior. More importantly, using a 2SLS approach to address
the endogeneity of migration, the empirical analysis shows a positive short-run impact
of international migration on educational aspirations. These results provide a new
perspective on the ongoing discussion about human capital externalities of migration
and a possible brain gain. The paper thereby contributes to the growing literature about
the effects of migration on households in the sending countries with an emphasis on
human capital accumulation. By focusing on aspirations, the present analysis is also
related to the nascent discussion about the transfer of norms and values in the context
of international migration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on aspirations
and human capital investment and describes the role of migration in this context in
depth. Section 3 formulates a simple conceptual framework. The data used for the
empirical analysis is introduced in section 4, and section 5 describes the econometric
strategy used. Descriptive statistics and estimation results are presented in sections 6
and 7, respectively. Section 8 discusses possible limitations of the analysis, and section
9 concludes.
2 Previous literature
Because the concept of aspirations is a social construct, it lends itself to a variety of
definitions. Broadly defined, aspirations can be understood as a desire to achieve a
certain objective. Aspirations differ from expectations in that they represent ideals or
higher values. Expectations, on the other hand, account for constraints and perceived
limitations. Accordingly, the term aspirations will be used to describe goals that one
would like to achieve in an ideal world without constraints and with full information
and expectations as probabilistic goals that one expects to achieve taking into consider-
ation all limitations one faces.
In economics, the idea of aspirations has been latently present for some time. Ques-
tioning classical economic theory and utility maximization, Herbert Simon (1959:263)
noted “[…] the conditions for satisfying a drive are not necessarily fixed, but may be
specified by an aspiration level that itself adjusts upward or downward on the basis of
experience”. When Kahneman and Tversky (1984) speak of the importance of reference
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tion that judgment and evaluations are based on prior experiences. Broadly speaking,
reference points are one major determinant of the goals people aspire to achieve.
The connection between human capital accumulation and aspirations has recently
gained more attention and has been used to model inequality and poverty persistence.
Dalton et al. (2010) show formally that aspirations can serve as a behavioral explanation
of poverty persistence. Their model establishes a theoretical link between constraints
that are internal to the economic agent and persistent poverty. They define aspirations
as a reference point and consider effort to be complementary to this reference point.
The authors argue that an initially low reference point raises the likelihood of a persist-
ent and binding internal constraint leading to a poverty trap. Dalton et al. (2010) use
these results as a normative justification for empowerment programs that increase
individuals’ aspirations. Mookherjee et al. (2010) analyze the effect of social context
and parental aspirations as determinants of investments in children’s education. At the
core of their model stands the assumption that parental pride in their children’s
achievements is on the one hand determined by the economic situation of their neigh-
bors, and on the other hand determines their investment behavior. They conclude that
spatial segregation and the implicit limitation of the aspiration window can lead to
persistent inequalities.
Apart from the possible presence of a low aspiration equilibrium, the central question
is why low aspirations prevail and how they can be changed. Various authors have pro-
posed that aspirations can be influenced by the exposure to new role models. Chiapa et
al. (2012) exploit data from the Mexican anti-poverty program Progresa and find that
children that were randomly exposed to highly educated staff such as doctors and
nurses had significantly higher educational aspirations. Another study that focused on
the importance of role models is Beaman et al. (2012). The authors provide strong
evidence from a randomized natural experiment in India where female community
leadership inspired girls’ educational attainment. Macours and Vakis (2009) also use
the random variation of female leadership in communities in Nicaragua to identify the
effect of role models on human capital and educational aspirations. The authors show
that changing aspirations brought about by new role models can have significant im-
pacts on the investment behavior of households. An example of a direct intervention is
presented by Krishnan and Krutikova (2013). The authors evaluate a NGO-program
that attempts to raise the self-esteem and aspirations of children in slums of Bombay.
They find that the program increased the aspiration window, which is measured by the
number of people children could name who were wealthier and served as role models.
These studies suggest that aspirations are responsive to changes in the environment
and can be modified. Yet, they cannot overcome two problems. First, the authors often
do not distinguish between aspirations and information. For example, Chiapa et al.
(2012) base their aspiration measure on a question that does not distinguish between
the change in information asymmetries and aspirations (i.e., “Up to what level would
you like your daughters [sons] to study?”). In a situation of incomplete information, it
is impossible to disentangle the information and aspiration effect. A pure aspiration
effect must be understood as goal setting under perfect information. The aspiration
measure employed in this analysis (see Section IV) considers this aspect and might
therefore be closer to a pure aspiration effect than previous contributions. Second, it
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into high educational achievements. Alexander et al. (1994) have shown that children
from less advantaged backgrounds are less likely to convert their educational aspira-
tions into desired educational achievements. Ideally, this problem should be addressed
in a panel-data approach. However, regardless of the data structure, there is no doubt
that with low aspirations, high educational achievements are more unlikely.
While the importance of aspirations for human capital formation is well established,
there is no consensus as to whether the externalities of international migration are
positive or negative for children’s education. While migration can improve the financial
situation of households through remittances, thereby alleviating resource constraints, it
can also negatively affect intra-household time allocation. Kandel and Kao (2001) find
positive effects of parental migration on children’s school performance in Mexico. They
attribute their findings to the improved financial situation of migrant families but also
argue that parental migration changes the motivation of children to attain a good
education. Mansuri (2006) presents evidence for Pakistan that points in the same direc-
tion. Although migration eases resource constraints and has positive effects on human
capital accumulation in general, the prospect of migration does not alter schooling
decisions. In contrast to these two contributions, Antman (2011) finds that paternal
migration from Mexico to the U.S. results in a reduction of time allocated to studies
and an increased work load of children. Her estimates suggest that these negative
short-term effects are driven primarily by boys in the age range of 12 to 15. Similar
results are presented by McKenzie and Rapoport (2006), who also observe that migra-
tion seems to depress the educational attainment of children. Additionally, they show
that the reduction in schooling is accounted for by the increased propensity of migra-
tion for boys and an increased household workload for girls.
There are other factors that moderate the effects of migration on educational
investments apart from the additional financial resources obtained via remittances.
First, the permanent absence of one parent and the resulting lack of guidance and
encouragement can have adverse effects on the educational attainment of children and
can produce changes in family roles (Biavaschi et al. 2015). This is especially important
since the parental nurture effect is one of the main drivers of intergenerational human
capital transfer (Holmlund et al. 2011) and might not be compensated by increased
income (Shea 2000).
Second, migrants are exposed to new environments and ideas that can lead to an
adjustment of their pre-migration priors. This migration-induced transmission of
knowledge, norms and values has been demonstrated to affect the up-take of low-
fertility norms (Beine et al. 2013) but also the political realm (Spilimbergo 2009). In the
case of Moldova, empirical evidence by Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) suggests a strong
link between the political atmosphere in the migration receiving country and the subse-
quent voting behavior of migrant households in the sending country. More precisely,
westward migration seems to reduce the electoral support for the far left of the Moldovan
political spectrum.
Third, migration itself can become a viable option for the children who see their
parents work abroad and thus affect educational attainment. Jensen (2012) has demon-
strated that individuals adjust their behavior quickly to new job market opportunities.
Using data from a randomized labor market intervention in India, he shows that young
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opportunity to engage in non-farm employment. That migration has a similarly strong
but qualitatively different effect on the life-cycle planning of households has been
proposed by Kandel and Massey (2002). They argue that migration becomes part of the
household’s life plan in the migrant sending countries. They find that the prospect of
migration to the U.S. shapes children’s behavior in Mexico by increasing the likelihood
of migrating to the U.S. and by lowering their odds of continuing with school. Thus,
the low aspirations of children could be the result of their perception that education is
not necessary to migrate, i.e., an underestimation of the return on investments in
education induced by the exposure to an apparently “easy” exit. In line with this
argument, McKenzie et al. (2013) present evidence from Tonga showing a systematic
bias in the expected wage differential. The authors attribute this bias to the underre-
porting of earnings by current migrants, moderate demands for remittances and the
disproportionate emphasis potential migrants put on negative migration experiences
reported by other people. An alternative explanation could be the employment of their
highly educated migrant parents in low skill jobs. Returns to foreign education are
often low (e.g., Hartog and Zorlu 2009, Sanromá et al. 2009) and could therefore
discourage parents and children who plan to migrate to adjust their aspirations
upwards.
There are only few papers that have focused on the relationship of educational aspira-
tions and migration. In a sample of Mexican students, Dreby and Stutz (2012) detect a
positive impact of maternal migration on educational aspirations, while the migration
of fathers leaves unchanged the aspirations of children. Using the Indonesian Family
and Life Survey, Czaika and Vothknecht (2014) report a positive correlation between
economic aspirations and migration. Opposed to this finding, Kandel and Kao (2001)
report lower educational aspirations at all academic levels of Mexican children growing
up in households with international migrants. These contributions often remain
descriptive and do not investigate the causal link between migration and educational
aspirations convincingly. The present analysis makes a contribution to the literature by
carefully trying to establish a causal relationship.
3 Conceptual framework
Most models that are concerned with the effect of migration on human capital invest-
ments and a possible brain gain are built on the premise that wage differentials are the
main determinant of migration (e.g., Stark et al. 1997, Mountford 1997, Vidal 1998,
Beine et al. 2001). A problem with this setup is that it does not account for the intrinsic
value of education (see Bénabou and Tirole 2003 for a detailed discussion). The present
framework intends to clarify the relationship between aspirations and human capital
investments. To allow an accessible interpretation, matters are kept as parsimonious as
possible. A simple static model with no general equilibrium effects based on Stark et al.
(1997) shows that the exclusion of the intrinsic value of human capital can lead to
underestimating the effects of migration on human capital investments. The presenta-
tion of the framework proceeds in three steps looking at investments (1) under autarky;
(2) with migration; and (3) with dynastic migration.
Assume individuals live for two periods, childhood and working age. Individuals
derive utility from consumption ct in both periods and from the intrinsic value of
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invest in human capital θ or work to finance consumption c1. In the second period, indi-
viduals can only work to finance consumption c2. Their objective function is given by:
Ud≡U c1;ψ θð Þ; c2ð Þ ð1Þ
Consumption is financed only by wages. Individuals can earn wage WH(θ) in their
home country. Labor demand and the wage function are exogenously determined and
identical for all individuals. To keep matters simple, a linear wage function will be used
such that WH θð Þ ¼ wH0 þ wH1 θ , where wH1 is the education premium which is time
invariant. Individuals face an exponentially increasing human capital cost function
C(θ) = γθ2 were γ > 1. Human capital is acquired instantly in the home country in
period one and remains unchanged in period two. For ease of exposition, no
restrictions are imposed on the total amount of human capital that can be
accumulated. Also, there is no capital market. The individual faces the following
resource constraints in the first and second period, respectively:
c1 ¼ WH θð Þ− C θð Þ ¼ wH0 þ wH1 θ− γθ2 ð2Þ
c2 ¼ WH θð Þ ¼ wH0 þ wH1 θ ð3Þ
In addition to these standard elements, the model contains a reference pointdependent disutility, following the discussion by Kogszegi and Rabin (2006), which is
represented by ψ(θ). The individual will choose the education of a certain reference
group θR that acts as a benchmark to evaluate her own household’s education level1.
This reference point, or aspiration level of education, will most likely be influenced by
the environment the individual is exposed to, e.g., family, neighborhood, co-workers.
This relates to the results by Mookherjee et al. (2010), who have argued that spatial
segregation will lead to persistent reference points, i.e., aspirations traps. The individual
will aspire to this reference point and experience increasing disutility the further away
she is from this benchmark. Let ψ(θ) = (θR − θ)2. It is reasonable to assume that individ-
uals aspire to higher goals and therefore – if it is possible – choose a higher reference
group than their current educational level such that θR ≥ θ.
Before introducing migration, let us consider the optimal human capital investment
in autarky. By substitution it can be shown that the individual will maximize the follow-
ing objective function:
Ud≡U c1;ψ θð Þ; c2ð Þ ¼ wH0 þ wH1 θ− γθ2− θR−θ
 2 þ wH0 þ wH1 θ ð4Þ
Solving for θ, it can be observed that the optimal autarky level of human capital θ* is:θ ¼ w
H
1 þ θR
γ þ 1 ð5Þ
In autarky human capital accumulation will be driven by the education premium wH ,1
by the reference level θR, and by the cost of education γ. The next step is to allow for
the possibility to migrate temporarily in the second period to work abroad. Assume at
the probability to migrate p is exogenous and applies equally to all individuals. In the
foreign country, individuals can earn a wage WF(θ) where WF θð Þ ¼ wF0 þ wF1θ. Let the
education premium in the foreign country be bigger than the education premium in
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H
1 . Migration will be costly such that migrants will earn
κWF(θ) in the foreign country where 0 < κ ≤ 1 is a cost factor. The resource constraint
in the second period will therefore take the following form:
c2 ¼ pκWF θð Þ þ 1−pð ÞWH θð Þ ¼ pκ wF0 þ wF1θ
 þ 1−pð Þ wH0 þ wH1 θ
  ð6Þ
By substituting the second period consumption of equation (6) into equation (4), theobjective function reads:
U c1;ψ θð Þ; c2ð Þ ¼ wH0 þ wH1 θ−γθ2− θR−θ
 2 þ pκ wF0 þ wF1θ
 þ 1−pð Þ wH0 þ wH1 θ
 
ð7Þ
The optimal level of human capital θ* given the probability to migrate p thusbecomes:
θ ¼ 2 w
H
1 þ θR
 þ p κwF1−wH1
 
2 γ þ 1ð Þ ð8Þ
Notice that the only difference between equations (5) and (8) is that the latter con-tains the probability weighted wage difference term (κwF1−w
H
1 ). It is readily observable
that a higher probability to migrate and/or a higher wage differential will increase the
investments in education in the first period. Given that migrants are only temporarily
permitted to work abroad, each generation faces the same decision. This dynamic
represents the standard brain gain argument.
In a dynastic migration setting, the implications of the reference point θR become
even more pronounced. Let the migration of the last generation only have an effect on
two variables: the migration cost κ and the reference point θR. To emphasize the inter-
generational transmission of these two variables, the subscript d will be used.
First, migration might decrease the migration cost. This effect reflects the strong evi-
dence on the importance of migrations networks (e.g., Munshi 2003). By introducing the
indicator variable md = {0, 1} — where md − 1 = 1 if the last dynasty migrated and zero if
not — this can be written as κd = κd − 1 + α(1 − κd − 1)md − 1. Alpha (α) is a deterministic in-
dicator reflecting how much the migration experience reduces migration costs and is de-
fined as 0 < α < 1. Thus, if the probability of migration is non-zero (p > 0) and the last
generation also migrated (md − 1 = 1), one would observe increased human capital
investment compared to a scenario where there is no connection between dynasties.
Second, the migration in the last generation could also raise the reference point the
dynasty uses. This change could come about through either externalities in the labor
market in the destination country due to the matching of the migrant with a certain
sector or other market interactions, or through externalities in social surroundings, i.e.,
interactions with co-workers, friends or neighbors. Let λ represent the difference
between the home and the foreign reference group such that λ ¼ θRF−θRH≥0. The link
of the reference point between dynasties can be thought of as:
θRd ¼ θRd−1 þ λmd−1 ð9Þ
If the last generation has migrated (md − 1 = 1) and the migrants have adopted a
higher reference point (λ > 0), then the aspired level of education θRd will increase
compared to migration without dynasties.
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To empirically investigate the role and evolution of aspirations, a unique household
survey dataset that was collected in Moldova between October 2011 and February 2012
will be employed. Moldova is an excellent environment to study the effects of migration
on aspirations and education. After Moldova emerged from the Soviet Union, it faced
the transition problems also observed in other post-Soviet countries. High unemploy-
ment and a stagnant economy in the late 1990s led to the increasing emigration of
Moldovans. Thus international migration is a relatively new socio-economic phe-
nomenon in Moldova. Nevertheless, only few states worldwide have a higher net migra-
tion rate than Moldova, among them Samoa and Tonga2. This is also reflected in the
high volume of official remittances, which is about 24% of the Moldovan GDP.
To understand the effects of migration on “Children and Elderly Left Behind”
(CELB), a face-to-face survey was conducted. The survey was built as a national repre-
sentative survey of households with children, elderly people and migrants using the
National Labor Force Survey (LFS) as sampling frame. In line with the LFS, the survey
is a stratified random sample of 3,539 households in 129 communities3. The question-
naire consisted of four modules. The first module elicited basic household characteris-
tics including the household composition, labor market activity and income. It also
contained an extensive section on the international migration of household members.
This migrant section captures in detail the migration history of each household mem-
ber since 1999. Based on this first module, caregivers of all children, children in the age
range of 10 to 18, and all elderly people in the household were identified. In a second
module, all caregivers were interviewed about topics such as health, education and the
behavior of their children. All caregivers of 3,594 children were interviewed in 2,082
different households. In a separate third module, 1,282 children between the ages of 10
and 18, i.e., all children in the sample households, were interviewed concerning similar
topics privately. Due to the structure of the sample, the empirical analysis concentrates
on cases in which migrants have left Moldova at some stage during the last 12 months
while their child stayed behind4. The interviews were conducted by trained surveyors
from a specialized survey company in Moldovan and Russian, depending on the
primary language of the household. Additionally, information on general aspects such
as education, health, infrastructure and labor markets was collected by means of a
community questionnaire in each community.
Central to the analysis are the questions asked to caregivers. Two specific questions
focused on the aspirations and expectations caregivers had for their children. First,
caregivers were asked the following question:
(1)“Imagine finances were not a problem and everything else went right, what is the
highest level of formal education you WISH [CHILD] could complete?”
As noted before, the literature often does not go into detail when defining what
constitutes aspirations: a change in the information set available or a change in the
utility maximization reference point under perfect information. Since Moldovans have
good access to modern communication technologies and media as well as free educa-
tion, the estimation results are more likely to capture the before mentioned aspiration
effect than a simple change in the information set of migrant households.
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Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) designed by UNESCO for the specific
purpose of compiling education statistics on recognized educational qualifications and
to make them comparable5. In the following analysis, this ordinal classification of
educational attainment was converted into years of schooling to allow a better
interpretation. In addition to these absolute aspirations, the survey also elicited the
level of expectations. This supplementary measure allows us to contrast the novel
notion of aspirations with the traditional expectations and investigate possible differ-
ences and similarities. Caregivers were asked the following question to measure their
expectations:
(2)“Consider your current financial situation and the child’s prospects. Using this card
on which 0 means impossible and 10 is certain, how likely is it that [CHILD] will
complete this level of education?”
This question aims at capturing the probabilistic expectations of parents. This
approach was chosen in line with the recommendations by Delavande et al. (2011) and
Attanasio (2009). More specifically, the respondent was presented the stylized image of
a ladder with 10 steps, the concept of probability was explained to her, and it was made
clear that the last step represented the full achievement of a set goal.
To corroborate the parental aspirations, children were also asked about their
aspirations in separate interviews. While a very high correlation between the two can
be observed in the data, the empirical analysis will concentrate on parental aspirations
for two reasons. First, whether educational plans can be interpreted as long-term goals
is contested. For example, Alexander and Cook (1979) showed that the mere expression
of intent by children can be volatile over time. Second, parents do control the financial
resources of the household. Their decisions will therefore have a larger impact on the
allocation of resources as compared to the aspirations of children.
Aspirations are defined as the unconstrained goal parents set for their children (i.e.,
question 1) and expectations as the product of the aspired years of education (question 1)
and the expected probability of achieving this goal (question 2).
To evaluate how migration as an alternative to local employment is transmitted
between generations, one question about migration aspirations was included in the
questionnaire of the caregivers.
(3)Do you think it would be good for [CHILD] to live or work in a different country
when [CHILD] finishes his/her formal education?
About one in five of the caregivers answered this question affirmatively; they were
also asked about the reason for giving this answer, which country they would their
children like to go to and whether formal education was important to work in the
particular destination country. The two main reasons they stated were the absence of
job opportunities in Moldova and a better way of life abroad. Family reunions were
only mentioned by roughly 2% of the caregivers as a reason. In line with the two major
migration corridors of Moldova, about 41% of the caregivers named Russia as the most
preferable destination followed by 20% who wanted their children to go to Italy.
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of formal education: 96% of the caregivers said that it would be an important requisite
for working in the destination country.
5 Empirical identification strategy
The goal of this analysis is to find out if, as assumed in the conceptual framework, a
causal relationship between migration and aspirations exists. The reduced form
equation to test the hypothesis of Eq. (9) is:
θij ¼ αþ λMij þ X0ijβþ εij ðaÞ
In this baseline specification, θij is the observed aspiration, Xij a vector of individualcharacteristics of the child i in household j, and Mij is the observed migration status of
the household the child is living in. While the analysis is focused primarily on edu-
cational aspirations, as suggested by the framework, it will also contain the analysis of
expectations and migration aspirations. The former makes it possible to examine
whether the concepts of aspirations and expectations differ. The latter can be used to
investigate the presence of chain migration dynamics.
Since none of the dependent variables is independent of migration (Mij), it cannot be
expected that E(εij|Mij) = 0. Suppose a household consisted of two parents raising two
children. One parent migrates to Italy, and the remaining caregiver has high educa-
tional aspirations for her children. The couple could have had high aspirations for their
children before one of them migrated and have chosen to work abroad to overcome
the credit constraints to fulfill these aspirations. They could also be very ambitious,
which led them to choose the migration strategy but is reflected by high aspirations in-
dependently of this migration decision. Thus, because migrants are not randomly
drawn from the population, OLS estimates could be severely upward biased if positive
self-selection is present. Conversely, if negative self-selection is the dominant migration
pattern, the OLS estimates could also underestimate the effect migration has on aspira-
tions. To address this problem, an exogenous variable (Z) is employed as an instrument
for the migration status in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) setup. The structural equa-
tion of the first stage is then:
Mij ¼ αþ ϕZij þ X0ijβþ ζij ðbÞ
Following McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) and Antman (2011), the instrumentalvariable is based on the GDP per capita growth rate in each of the destination countries
between 2004 and 2010 weighted by the size of the migrant network proxied by the
number of migrants from the community who had migrated to the destination country
by 20046. The instrument is based on the assumption that the higher GDP per capita
growth, the more likely are migrants to find employment, and the higher their wages
will be, i.e., it emphasizes the pull effects of economic growth at the destination. While
there is no doubt that the change in GDP growth is completely exogenous to the
conditions and characteristics of the household in Moldova, it seems necessary to
adjust the strength of this pull effect by the size of the migrant network at the time of
the change. The migration network is regarded as the information channel through
which the exogenous shock operates. Migration networks proxied by current migrant
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tion effect networks have as they improve the chances of employment and finding
housing at the destination. According to the World Development Indicator database,
GDP per capita (in constant 2005 international $) grew on average 2.9% per annum in
the 90 countries the index is built from. The most prevalent migration destinations in
2004 were Russia, Italy, Romania, Ukraine and Portugal, which consequently weigh
most heavily in the index. These five countries had an average growth rate of GDP per
capita of 2.6% between 2004 and 2010. The identifying assumption is that changes in
economic growth represented by GDP per capita in the destination countries, weighted
by the strength by which communities in Moldova were connected to these countries
through migration networks in 2004, are predictive of current migration rates and only
have an impact on current enrollment and educational aspirations through migration.
In the context of Moldova, there is – in addition to the issue of self-selection – the
question of sorting. There are two major migration corridors that lead to the West,
mainly Italy, due to linguistic proximity of Romanian and Italian, and to the East,
mainly Russia due to historic ties. Yet, it is not possible to use GDP variation to
estimate the effect of migration to one specific country since this instrument only rep-
resents an overall pull effect. Thus, the effect of going to Russia compared to migrating
to Italy cannot be disentangled using only the GDP per capita growth rate. This differ-
ence is of crucial importance since Russia alone absorbs around 60% of Moldovan
migrants in the sample. Hence, an additional second instrument is the presence of
Soviet military personnel in each community before 1990. The assumption behind this
binary variable is that the allocation of Soviet military in Moldova was independent of
household characteristics and regional differences but that it was rather driven by
strategic factors. Because Moldova, as part of the Soviet Union, constituted one of the
border countries with the West, it was considered strategically important. Additionally,
because of the small size of Moldova, Soviet military personnel were present in many
communities. In about one-quarter of the communities in the sample, community
leaders told us that Russian military personnel lived or worked in the community be-
fore 1990. The assumptions this instrument is based on are similar to those described
in the case of migration networks. Since soldiers became part of the local social net-
work, their presence could decrease the migration cost to Russia for people living in
these communities. Thus, the presence of Russian military personnel before 1990
should only boost migration to Russia but have no effect on migration to the West.
One problem with this instrument is that the presence of high ranking officers could
have had a role model effect on local aspirations and would thus in the estimation
setup also influence aspirations indirectly. However, there is no statistically significant
difference in the aspirations of communities that hosted Russian military personnel and
those that did not.
One threat to the validity of the instruments is the recent emergence of migration
networks. Since migration in Moldova only took off in the late 1990s, relatively recent
migration stocks are used as a proxy for the evolving networks. The risk this entails is
that the instruments do not only capture the network effect but also the current
economic conditions of the sending region. Thus, regional dummies and household
control variables are included. To ensure that only the migration effects for one
migration spell independent of the migration history are captured, the robustness of
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 12 of 24the findings is tested by including a dummy variable that indicates if the household had
migrants before 2011. This dummy did not alter the results qualitatively. A second
problem is the non-linearity of the effects migration has on the households in the
sending country. More specifically, parents would have to spend a longer time at the
destination to update their priors about education, i.e., to decrease or increase their
aspirations. Also from a financial perspective, migrants who leave the country for the
first time have to bear more costs than regular migrants, which decreases the amount
of money remitted to their families. The observed effects of recent migration can
therefore be understood as the lower bound of the overall effect migration has.
6 Descriptives
Table 1 reports the basic summary statistics. On average, the household size is 4.9, and
2.1 children live in each household (see column 2). Out of all households with children,
28% had a member who lived or worked abroad for at least three months in 2011.
About one-third of the migrants go to countries in Western Europe, and two-thirdsTable 1 Descriptive statistics









Households Household size 4.87 4.78 5.07 0.00
Number of Children 2.12 2.16 2.00 0.00
Migrant household .28 - 1 -
West Migrant .10 - .34 -
East Migrant .19 - .69 -
HH Income in US$ 3611.88 3166.18 4749.04 0.00
Remittances as share of Income .13 - .46 -
Educ. expenditure as share of Income .21 .23 .16 0.00
Below Poverty Line (2 Int. $) .02 .02 .02 .18
Urban (yes = 1) .22 .25 .15 0.00
Panel B
Caregiver Age of Caregiver 38.15 37.61 39.52 0.00
Gender of Caregiver (male =1) .10 .08 .16 0.00
Education in years 11.01 11.03 10.95 .43
Educ. Aspirations in years 15.41 15.36 15.53 .09
Educ. Expectations in years 11.53 11.36 11.98 0.00
Migration Aspirations (yes = 1) .21 .21 .23 .14
Panel C
Children Age 9.84 9.78 10.01 .30
Gender (male = 1) .51 .52 .49 .16
Enrolled (10 - 18 years) .90 .91 .88 .11
Enrolled (10 - 15 years) .98 .99 .98 .49
Enrolled (16 - 18 years) .77 .77 .76 .73
Notes: Calculations based on households with children in CELB 2012. Answers “Don’t know” and “Refused to answer”
excluded. Observations used to calculate values might deviate due to missing values; two-tailed t-tests assuming
unequal variances.
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 13 of 24migrate to the East, i.e., almost exclusively Russia (see column 4). On average, about
60% of the migrants that leave for Western destinations are female. By contrast,
migrants to the East are predominantly male (74%). The convergence of migrant skill
levels for eastward and westward migrants shown in Figure 1 suggests that the positive
selection of migrants who go to the West seems to have decreased since 19997.
Migrants are on average 34 years old and have 11.12 years of education. About 63% of
all migrants are married. It is mostly the husbands who leave their wives and children
behind. Nevertheless, an increasing feminization of migration seems to take place as
also women migrate in increasing numbers, mostly to the West.
Nearly half the migrants were unemployed before they left for the first time, and
most of them worked in agriculture and construction. Roughly 84% of the migrants
come back at least once a year or go back and forth on a regular basis. While abroad,
85% communicate with household members at least once a week or more often. Thus,
the connection between migrants and those left behind is by all means quite close. On
average, 63% of the migrants have a work permit for their destination country. In the
destination countries, the migrants work mostly in the construction sector or have
individual household employers, i.e., sectors that are likely to have a low education
premium. The remittances generated by these migrants make up about 46% of the total
household income of migrant households in Moldova. This also explains the significant
difference between the total income of migrant and that of non-migrant households8.
Caregivers are predominantly the biological parents of the children (87%). Yet, about
10% of the children live in so-called gap-household structures, where both biological
parents have migrated and grandparents have taken on the role of caregivers. On aver-
age, caregivers are 38 years old and have 11 years of schooling (see Panel B in Table 1).
The significant difference in age of about two years between migrant and non-migrant
caregivers is attributable to the gap-households. There is no significant difference in
the average years of schooling, neither between caregivers in migrant and non-migrant
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Figure 1 Distribution of expectations by migration status. Note: Kemel density estimate. Calculations based
on CELB 2012.
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 14 of 24Caregivers would like their children to complete on average 15.4 years of schooling
(see Panel B in Table 1). When taking into consideration the constraints they face, they
expect their children to complete around 11.5 years of schooling, which equals upper
secondary education. These average values conceal that aspirations are concentrated
around first-stage tertiary education (see Figure 2). Caregivers desire in 53.15% of the
cases a first-stage tertiary degree for their children. Note that few households in the
total sample stated second tertiary education as their aspiration. There is also a strong
gender-based divergence of aspirations. Caregivers have systematically higher aspira-
tions for girls. The spread of this difference of educational aspirations for boys and girls
seems to increase with the age of children. This divergence is driven mainly by decreas-
ing aspirations for boys, while aspirations for girls remain constant independently of
age. Caregivers expect that their children will reach the set educational goal, on aver-
age, with a probability of 74.2%. When asked what the main reason for not reaching
the set goal was, 9 out of 10 caregivers cited financial constraints. Caregivers in migrant
households expect their children to complete a significantly higher number of years of
formal education. This is confirmed by the visual comparison of the distribution of expec-
tations of migrant and non-migrant households in Figure 3. Caregivers in migrant house-
holds tend to have a more optimistic attitude towards the realization of the educational
aspirations of their children. However, the enrollment rates of children in all cohorts are
almost indistinguishable based on simple means testing (see Panel C in Table 1). The me-
dian expenditure per child is around 6% of the total household income9.
When asked about migration aspirations, 21% of the caregivers stated that it would be
good for their children to work or live abroad (see Panel B in Table 1). Since the survey
also asked this question to the children from 10 to 18 years of age, it is possible to com-
pare their answers with the point of view of their caregivers. The transmission of migra-
tion aspirations between children and parents is quite strong. Even after controlling for
individual and household characteristics, children appear to be much more likely to state
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Figure 3 Distribution of aspirations by migration status. Note: Calculations based on CELB 2012.
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Clearly, putting aspirations at the center of an economic analysis is only justified if it
affects behavior. Before turning to the relationship of migration and aspirations, this
hypothesis is tested by analyzing the correlations of aspirations and enrollment as well
as the monetary expenditure of households for schooling (see Additional file 1). Because
education is compulsory for nine years from the age of 7 to 16 in Moldova, the estimation
concentrates on the narrow age range of 16 to 18, which captures enrollment in the upperTable 2 The effect of migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Educational aspirations Expectations Migration aspirations
OLS OLS Logit
Migrant since 1999 0.33** 0.46** 0.26*
(0.14) (0.19) (0.12)
Migrant in 2011 0.30** 0.53*** 0.24*
(0.14) (0.16) (0.13)
Age of Child in years 0.02* 0.02 0.02* 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender of Child
(male = 1)
−0.77*** −0.76*** −0.76*** −0.98*** −0.97*** −0.97*** 0.19** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Education of Caregiver 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Other children (yes = 1) −0.38*** −0.35*** −0.35*** −0.19 −0.15 −0.15 −0.15* −0.12 −0.12
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Obs 2197 2197 2197 2152 2152 2152 3547 3547 3547
R2 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25
McFadden’s R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
Notes: Calculations based on households with children in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; Controlling also for orphan and semi-orphan, caregiver characteristics, marital status of parents, ethnicity,
and household composition; district and grade dummies included; Standard errors clustered at the household level.
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 16 of 24secondary level. This level is not compulsory since it permits access to higher education.
Unfortunately, the effects of aspirations on higher education cannot be observed directly
due to the cross-sectional structure of the data. The estimation results reported in the ap-
pendix show that a one-year increase in aspirations is associated with a 4% higher prob-
ability of being enrolled in the age range of 16 to 18. Aspirations and expectations also
matter greatly for the investment in the education of children. A one-year increase in as-
pirations yields an average increase in schooling expenditure of about 12% per child per
year. Overall, this evidence highlights the importance of aspirations and expectations for
the extensive and intensive margin of human capital accumulation.
In Table 2, the OLS estimation results concerning the association between migra-
tion, aspirations and expectations are reported. Throughout all specifications, mi-
gration is associated with significantly higher levels of aspirations and expectations
(see columns 2-3 and 5-6). Two different measures of migration experience were
employed. The first variable captures if any migration has taken place in a house-
hold since 1999, which is when large scale migration from Moldova to other countries
started. The main reason for introducing this variable is that first-time migration is likely
to be more costly than repeated migration, and first-time migration could also be insuffi-
cient to alter the migrant’s stance on education. Thus, someone with 10 years of migration
experience will make different contributions to the household than someone who left the
country recently for the first time. Since no significant differences between the accumu-
lated migration experience since 1999 and the current migration in 2011 can be observed,
there is no reason to be overly concerned about the non-linearity of migration effects. In
columns 7-9, the household’s migration status is related to the migration aspirations the
caregivers have for their children. The estimation results show that caregivers in migrants
households seem to favor the migration of their children.
Because estimating the causal effect of migration on an observable outcome is prob-
lematic due to endogeneity, an instrumental variable strategy will be used as outlined
before. Using the conventional Wu-Hausman F and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 test
(not reported), the null that migration is an endogenous regressor cannot be rejected.
Table 3 shows the effects of the instruments in the first stage. Both the first and second
stage include variables containing the size of the different migration networks to make
sure that identification only runs through the variation of economic growth in the coun-
tries of destination. As expected, the average GDP growth in the destination countries
between 2004 and 2010 increases the propensity to migrate in communities that have net-
works with these countries. A one-unit increase of the growth in all destinations, weighted
by the stock of migrants in each destination, increases the probability to migrate by 4-6%
(see columns 1 and 4). This effect is statistically significant and robust over all specifica-
tions except for migration to the East. A clear specialization of networks can be observed;
communities that had migrants in Italy in 2004 are less likely to witness migration to the
East in 2011; while households in communities with strong migratory ties to the East in
2004 are less likely to migrate to the West in 2011. It is important to note that the former
presence of Russian military personnel in the community increases the likelihood of mi-
grating in 2011 to Russia by around 8% but has no effect on migration to the West. This
makes it possible to instrument not only the migration decision of households, but also
the self-sorting of migrants into Eastern and Western countries. Under the identification
assumption, the strong effect of the exogenous GDP growth at the destination and the
Table 3 First stage - the migration decision (Logit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All West East All West East
GDPpc Growth 2004 weighted
by migrant network
0.22** 0.58*** −0.15 0.31*** 0.58*** −0.06
(0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Military Personnel 0.31** −0.05 0.48**
(0.15) (0.25) (0.19)
Migrant Stock in Italy 2004 −0.00 0.01 −0.01** −0.00 0.01 −0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Migrant Stock in Russia 2004 −0.01 −0.04*** 0.02* −0.02** −0.05*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Migrant Stock in Ukraine 2004 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Migrant Stock in Romania 2004 −0.05*** −0.05** −0.01 −0.06*** −0.06*** −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age of Child in years 0.01 −0.01 0.02* 0.00 −0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Gender of Child (male = 1) −0.09 −0.12 −0.03 −0.11 −0.15 −0.04
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
Education of Caregiver 0.04 0.07** 0.02 0.03 0.07** 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Other children (yes = 1) −0.63*** −0.45*** −0.57*** −0.64*** −0.41** −0.59***
(0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13)
Obs 3547 3547 3547 2926 2926 2926
McFadden R2 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.06
Wald Chi2 205.3 231.9 104.8 204.3 256.6 86.49
Notes: Calculations based on households with children in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; Controlling also for caregiver characteristics, marital status of parents, ethnicity, and household
composition; regional dummies included; Standard errors clustered at the household level.
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 17 of 24quasi-random presence of Russian military personnel in the community on migration can
be used to test the causal effect of migration on aspirations.
The corresponding IV estimates of migration effects are reported in Table 4. In
column 1, the coefficient of migration is positive and statistically significant, which
points to a strong effect of migration on the educational aspirations of caregivers for
children in the household. Since the level of aspirations is capped at post-tertiary
education, the migration experience cannot shift the aspirations any further than
22 years of education. Hence, the effect of migration should be stronger for households
with a low human capital endowment. In column (2) the instrumental variable is
interacted with a dummy variable (LEduc) if the caregiver has less than 11 years of edu-
cation. The threshold of 11 years represents the mean level of education of caregivers.
The migration of household members of households at the lower end of the human
capital distribution has a significantly positive effect on the educational aspirations of
caregivers for children in the household, while the overall effect of migration becomes
indistinguishable from zero. One possible interpretation of this finding is that highly edu-
cated households already have aspirations for their children that are at the high end of the
Table 4 The effect of migration (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Educational aspirations Expectations Migration aspirations
Migrant in 2011 3.22** 0.58 3.79** 2.71 0.39* 0.75***
(1.63) (2.02) (1.73) (2.00) (0.21) (0.24)
Migrant in 2011*LEduc 4.95** 0.81 −0.68
(2.41) (3.06) (0.49)
Migrant in 2011 West 1.93 6.64** 0.30
(1.99) (2.99) (0.24)
Migrant in 2011 East 4.80** 0.77 0.57
(2.24) (2.33) (0.36)
Age of Child in years −0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender of Child
(male = 1)
−0.59*** −0.60*** −0.61*** −0.71*** −0.72*** −0.73*** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education of Caregiver 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.45*** −0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Other children (yes = 1) 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.27) (0.31) (0.33) (0.28) (0.25) (0.28) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Obs 2503 2503 2503 2435 2435 2435 2926 2926 2926
F-Statistic 19.21 16.76 15.01 22.71 26.68 19.93 7.246 5.507 6.376
CDW F-Statistic 15.70 8.418 11.66 16.43 9.197 13.53 10.66 4.415 7.837
Hanson J-Statistic 0.164 0.452 - 0.0976 0.193 - 0.416 0.192 -
Notes: Calculations based on households with children in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; Controlling also for caregiver characteristics, marital status of parents, ethnicity, and household
composition; regional dummies included, migration stocks in Italy, Russia, Ukraine and Romania; Instruments are GDP per
capita growth (2004-2010) in destination countries weighted by migrant network size in community in 2000; Standard errors
clustered at the household level.
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up. On the other hand, it does not seem to decrease their aspirations. If highly educated
migrants were not able to generate a wage premium from their education during their
stay abroad, they might be induced to consider education for their children as futile and
reduce their aspirations. This is not the case. Splitting the effect of migration by destin-
ation shows that the sign for eastward migration is positive and significant at the 5% level,
while the sign for westward migration is positive but statistically insignificant (see column
3). This also reflects the negative selection of eastward migrants. In conclusion, house-
holds with a small endowment of human capital seem to adjust the educational aspira-
tions upwards due to the migration experience of the household members.
Columns 4-6 of Table 4 contain the estimates with respect to the relation between mi-
gration and expectations. The results indicate that caregivers become more confident
about the educational attainment of their children. This may reflect the relaxation of the
resource constraint of migrant households as a result of receiving remittances. Direct
schooling cost and foregone earnings of the child due to continuing education appear less
problematic, which allows caregivers to be more optimistic and to expect higher educa-
tional attainment. It is interesting that only caregivers in households with migrants in the
West have more positive expectations, whereas living in a household with migrants in the
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 19 of 24East has no effect on the expectations at any conventional significance level. This result
could reflect the different returns to migration. Westward migrants sent on average 16%
more remittances than migrants in the East. This interpretation is in line with the hypoth-
esis that the expectations are strongly driven by the resource constraint of the household.
The strong difference between the effect of migration on educational aspirations and
expectations also underline the different implications of these closely related measures.
Contrary to the OLS results regarding the effects of migration on migration aspira-
tions (see Table 2), a significant increase in migration aspirations in households with
migrants is found. The linear probability estimates in columns 7 to 9 of Table 4 suggest
an increase in the likelihood of favoring the migration of their children. In the context of
the conceptual framework, the hypothesis that migration networks show self-reinforcing
dynamics by transmitting preferences for migration to the next generation of the house-
hold cannot be rejected. This observation supports what has been called chain migration.
Differentiating by gender of children and migrants did not reveal structural differences
in either case. The estimates of different sub-samples mostly did not differ in a statistically
significant way. This might be due to the relatively small size of the sub-samples.
At the bottom of Table 4, the results of two tests are reported that evaluate the validity
and strength of the instruments. First, the results for the Hanson J reported in the last row
of Table 4 cannot reject the null that the excluded instruments are valid with one excep-
tion. Second, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic of the first-stage estimations is used to check the
relevance of the instruments. These F-statistics show, based on a comparison with the
reference values for weak instruments presented by Stock and Yogo (2002), that the instru-
ments allow an identification of the effect of migration on aspirations and expectations.
However, it is necessary to be cautious with the interpretation of the results regarding the
effect of migration on migration aspirations due to possibly weak instruments.
While both OLS and 2SLS estimates point to the economically significant effects of
migration, the considerable differences in estimated coefficients have to be noted. As
mentioned before, one explanation for the higher coefficients of the instrumented
estimation effects compared to OLS could be negative self-selection of migrants. Yet,
since from the descriptive statistics no clear picture regarding self-selection emerges, a
more plausible explanation for the higher 2SLS coefficients is the heterogeneity of the
treatment effects. The 2SLS estimates only represent a local average treatment effect
since those responsive to the instrumentation, i.e., the GDP per capita growth at the
destination, might not be representative of the overall population (see Angrist et al
1996). Using a threshold of 0.5, the first stage correctly predicts around 3 out of 4
cases. The households which do not respond to the exogenous variation in GDP at the
destinations but still migrate are concentrated in the north of the country and are
mostly located at the border with the Ukraine or Romania. Migrants in these house-
holds are more likely to go to the East than those who comply with the variation of the
instrument. However, these correlations do not reveal possible differences in unobserv-
able characteristics such as the motivation to migrate because the true subpopulation
of compliers cannot be identified. It is possible that the non-compliers leave out of
economic necessity, irrespective of the change in situation in the destination country,
and do not consider the option of migrating as an opportunity. This pressure could
lead them to reject the norms of the destination country and thereby leave their aspira-
tions unaffected. Those who respond to the improving situation at the destination,
Table 5 Average treatment effects based on propensity score matching results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Educational aspirations Expectations Migration aspirations


















ATT 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.58 0.32 0.40 0.04 0.05 0.04
Bootstrap SE 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02
Pr(|T| > |t|) 0.000 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Obs 3027 3027 3027 2944 2944 2944 3547 3547 3547
Notes: Calculations based on households with children in CELB 2012. Propensity score based on child age and gender, orphan and semi-orphan status, caregiver characteristics, marital status of parents, ethnicity,













Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 21 of 24reflected by the change in GDP, might be able to choose migration as a superior in-
come source and may be more receptive to influences at the destination.
8 Robustness and limitations
The robustness of the reported IV estimates was also evaluated using Propensity Score
Matching (PSM)10. The counterfactual is constructed by matching migrants and non-
migrants conditionally on observable characteristics, collapsed into a single index, in a ran-
dom process. The results from three commonly used techniques, i.e., five nearest-neighbor
matching, radius matching, and nonparametric matching, echo the findings obtained using
instrumental variables (see Table 5). These estimations also suggest a positive relationship be-
tween migration and educational aspirations. However, the coefficients are much smaller,
which stems from the fact the employed matching estimators produce average treatment ef-
fect on the treated and not local average treatment effects as observed with instrumental vari-
able methods. Since the main assumption of matching methods is that the selection into
migration is not affected by unobservable characteristics, these results have to be interpreted
with care. As pointed out during the discussion of instrumental variable methods, both
migration and aspirations are likely to be driven by characteristics that cannot be measured.
Several potential caveats remain in the interpretation of the findings. As noted before,
it is difficult to disentangle the information and aspiration effect of migration. The pre-
sented results are more likely to reflect a pure aspiration effect, i.e., that migration
changes the goal setting of households having full information, than a simple change in
information available to households for two reasons: First, 91.6% of the households in
the sample have a television, and about one-third of the households have a computer,
i.e., people have the means to access information. Second, and more importantly, if mi-
gration were only an information channel, previous migration waves would have made
pure information available before 2011. Since the estimations control for the migration
stock in 2004, the access to information, e.g., about available education premia abroad,
would have already been supplied by these migrant networks.
Another drawback of the analysis is that the effect of remittances cannot be observed
directly. This means that the possibility that the additional financial resources are
responsible for the change in aspirations cannot be eliminated. Although a condition of
“unlimited resources” is explicitly included in the question for aspirations, it remains
uncertain that this phrasing was enough to visualize this situation. While this income
effect is a serious issue, the results suggest that it affects expectations rather than aspi-
rations. If the observed effect was driven only by the decreased liquidity constraints
due to remittances, the effect of aspirations and expectations should show no differences.
Yet, by comparing columns 3 and 6 in Table 4, it becomes clear that migration to the East
and to the West have significantly different effects on aspirations and expectations. While
eastward migration changes aspirations, it has no effect on expectations. On the other
hand, westward migration has a strong impact only on expectations. It could be argued
that this difference reflects the different amounts of remittances received, with migrants
in the West sending significantly more money, which allows households with migrants in
the West to be more confident about the educational achievements of their children.
The interpretation of these results with respect to possible “brain grain” requires two
qualifications. First, the cross-sectional nature of the dataset impedes the observation
and analysis of the realization of the educational aspirations that constitute the core of
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conversion of aspirations into educational attainment. Second, it must be acknowledged
that the brain gain will only take place if not all children in migrant households leave
the country after realizing more education. In this respect, the analysis relies on the
same assumption as contributions that argue in favor of the monetary incentive effects.9 Concluding remarks
This paper argues that international migration affects human capital accumulation not only
by relaxing the resource constraints of households but through a change in the educational
aspirations caregivers have for their children in migrant sending households. This hypoth-
esis is tested using a unique household survey dataset. The different lines of evidence pre-
sented converge on the conclusion that parental migration can change the educational
trajectory of children in migrant households with low human capital endowment through
an upward adjustment of educational aspirations. This suggests that migrants up-
date their priors about the importance of education while abroad and transmit
them to the caregivers of children in the sending country. Since this relationship be-
tween aspirations and migration is tested in a country with high enrollment rates and a gen-
erally high level of formal education, the results must be interpreted as the lower bound of
the effect migration can have on aspirations.
Overall, these findings suggest a new channel of brain gain as a result of international mi-
gration. While the current models are based on the premise that human capital investments
will be increased by the opportunity to migrate, the present estimation results suggest that
an increase in human capital could also be triggered by the positive externality migration
has on educational aspirations. The estimation results imply that even a temporary migra-
tion spell could induce increased human capital investments. Thus, a brain gain could take
place even if parents had the chance to migrate while children do not have this opportunity.
The present results are also highly policy-relevant in a broader context. Important deter-
minants of human capital accumulation such as parental education are quite inflexible,
whereas aspirations react flexibly to new impulses. If intergenerational human capital trans-
fer is regulated strongly by the aspiration levels of parents, public policy could increase over-
all human capital accumulation by implementing measures that shift the educational
aspirations parents have for their children upwards. Examples for these kind of measures in-
clude mentoring and peer education programs, extra-curricular activities, as well as parent
involvement. Such policies would not only counter inequality but could also be more cost-
effective than other policy measures, since supply-side interventions in the education sector
will have a low return on investment without the necessary demand for education. More
schools will not lead to an increased human capital stock without high educational aspira-
tions of parents for their children.
Endnotes




N ; where N
represents the total number of families in the neighborhood. The relevant reference
group could also be relatives, classmates, co-workers or friends.
2Comparisons are made based on the 2010 World Development Indicators compiled
by the World Bank.
Böhme IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:12 Page 23 of 243Since the LFS does not include Transnistria, the sample is limited to households that
are located in the West of the River Dniester.
4Migration is defined as being abroad for at least 3 months during the last 12 months.
5The resulting scale is composed of (1) primary education, (2) lower secondary edu-
cation, (3) upper secondary education, (4) post-secondary education, (5) first stage
tertiary education (bachelor), (6) first stage tertiary education (master), and (7) second
stage tertiary education.
6Zij ¼ 1C 
XC
k¼1 MIGjk  ΔGDPpcjk
 
, where the instrumental variable Zij for child i
in community j is the GDP per capita growth (ΔGDPpc) in the destination coun-
tries C weighted by the number of migrants in the destination country from this com-
munity (MIG).
7The recent changes in visa requirements for Moldovans traveling to the European
Union might have a direct effect on the observed mechanism of migration on aspira-
tions. The regularization and integration of migrants that have been until now undocu-
mented could increase their exposure to local norms and values and increase the
observed effect. In the long run, the changed access to the European Union could
change the composition of the flow of migrants, which could affect the relationship be-
tween migration and aspirations indirectly.
8Total income comprises the personal income of all household members coming
from compensation for labor, pensions, social insurance benefits, remittances and other
transfers, as well as the income of the household as a whole from the sale of agricul-
tural production and livestock and social security benefits.
9Schooling expenditure per child comprises expenditures on schooling materials such
as textbooks and uniforms as well as on additional gifts to school teachers, transporta-
tion expenditures and the cost of supplemental tutoring.
10See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002) for a discussion
of this method.
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